Abstract-With the integration of advanced computing and communication technologies, smart grid is considered as the nextgeneration power system, which promises self healing, resilience, sustainability, and efficiency to the energy critical infrastructure. The smart grid innovation brings enormous challenges and initiatives across both industry and academia, in which the security issue emerges to be a critical concern. In this paper, we present a survey of recent security advances in smart grid, by a data driven approach. Compared with existing related works, our survey is centered around the security vulnerabilities and solutions within the entire lifecycle of smart grid data, which are systematically decomposed into four sequential stages: 1) data generation; 2) data acquisition; 3) data storage; and 4) data processing. Moreover, we further review the security analytics in smart grid, which employs data analytics to ensure smart grid security. Finally, an effort to shed light on potential future research concludes this paper.
exploding into the largest example of Internet-of-things, which will inevitably converge to something called Enernet.
However, the beauty of the smart grid innovation comes with its danger: the integration and dependency upon cyber infrastructure would exceedingly increase the chances of cyber threats and attacks. On the one hand, critical control processes such as state estimation, economic dispatch, load aggregation and demand response, etc, all rely on a secure and robust cyber infrastructure, which are indispensable to all aspects of smart grid. On the other hand, the cyber vulnerabilities may also enable adversaries to manipulate meter measurements, system parameters and price information, and even intrude and acquire direct access to these critical routines, to destabilize the grid in unpredictable ways. In the roadmap to secure control system proposed by Department of Energy and Department of Homeland security [2] , energy control systems are subject to targeted cyber attacks. Potential adversaries have pursued progressively devious means to exploit flaws in system components, telecommunication methods, and common operating systems with intent to infiltrate and sabotage vulnerable control systems. Sophisticated cyber attack tools require little technical knowledge to use and can be found on the Internet, as can manufacturers' technical specifications for popular control system equipment. As mentioned in [3] , security issues are considered as one of the highest priorities for the smart grid design. Therefore, the cyber security in smart grid has become a key concern with increasing urgency for the research community.
As a result, a tremendous amount of efforts have been put into the research of security issues in smart grid. Various reactive (acting against the past) and proactive (acting in anticipation) methodologies are proposed to reduce the risk of threats, increase the ability to detect and identify system anomalous behavior, and initiate mitigation countermeasures quickly to restore the system operations. Since the nature of threats and vulnerabilities are constantly changing, the applications of current best security practices are necessary but not sufficient. To greatly facilitate ongoing and future research of security technologies in smart grid, comprehensive surveys about previously efforts are essential and valuable, such as [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . We notice that this line of works usually organize the survey from the perspective of communication architectures and network layers, and the attacks and countermeasures described are centered around the requirements listed in [9] , such as integrity, confidentiality, availability, authenticity, authorization, and non repudiation, etc. For example, the attacks, such as man-in-the-middle and DoS attacks, and the countermeasures, such as authentication and key management protocols, have all been discussed in each of the above works.
In this paper, we are motivated to investigate and survey the security advances of smart grid from a different perspective: a data driven approach. We believe that the goal of cyber security is to protect data, both in transit and at rest. Therefore, our survey is centered around the security issues within the entire lifecycle of smart grid data, which can be systematically decomposed into four sequential stages [10] : data generation, data acquisition, data storage and data processing. To capture the wide spectrum of technologies concerning each area, we summarize the previous related efforts, structure comparisons and provide insights for remaining challenges. In addition, we further review the security analytics in smart grid, which employ the big data analytics to ensure smart grid security. Our approach renders extra values in comparison with previous survey works by explicitly bridging the security issues with big data technologies in smart grid domain. Specifically, we have striven to cover the following aspects of smart grid security advances:
• Data generation security: We first summarize various data sources in Smart Grid system, and categories them into power generation, power transmission and distribution, and load management. Then the security challenges for each category are further discussed.
• Data acquisition security: The data acquisition process relies on the underling communication protocols to gather the data from data sources to data storage. Therefore, we first present the general communication protocols for data acquisitions in Smart Grid and then address the issues of secure data collection and privacy-preserving data sharing.
• Data storage security: Large-volume and reliable data storages are indispensable for Smart Grid data streams. In this part, we describe the different data storage mechanisms for Smart Grid and review the related works about data storage security.
• Data processing security: The Smart Grid data are eventually processed within certain applications to deliver their values. It is essential to emphasize the security mechanisms of Smart Grid applications. In this section, we discuss the security aspects of two well known smart grid applications-demand response and state estimation.
• Security analytics: From the security perspective, data could be both the problem and the solution. In other words, data analytics could also provide promising solutions to ensure security. Thus, we summarize the data sources, data analysis methods as well as data visualization approaches for security analytics in Smart Grid. We survey all together 180 papers from conferences and journals, spanned mainly from 2010-2015. Our work not only comprehensively discusses the state-of-the-art technologies, but also is complementary to the coverage of existing survey papers. It is our humble expectation that this work can server as a first stop for general audiences and domain experts to search for information and guideline upon their specific needs regarding security solutions of smart grid.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we summarize the existing survey works about cyber security in smart grid. In Section III, we present an overview of smart grid and its key subsystems. From Sections IV-VII, we introduce the security issues within each phase of smart grid data: data generation, data acquisition, data storage and data processing. Then in Section VIII, we discuss the security analytics in smart grid. Finally, we identify the future directions and give the conclusions in Sections IX and X, respectively.
II. RELATED WORKS
Cyber security issues in Smart Grid have been capturing the interests of research community for a while. Therefore, there exists quite a few of survey papers related to this topic. In this part, we review the existing survey works to have a good knowledge of previous efforts.
The first line of works intend to cover the security issues of entire Smart Grid system. Wang and Lu [6] extensively examine the communication networks within both transmission subsystem and distribution subsystem of Smart Grid, including the wide-area network (SCADA) and local-area network (AMI). The authors first introduce the network architecture, features and protocols of Smart Grid communication network and explicitly compare those with the ones of Internet. Afterwards, they classify the potential threats and attacks within each layer of the communication network and employ a series of key uses cases of Smart Grid communication networks in [9] , in order to further uncover the network vulnerabilities. Finally, the corresponding countermeasures based on networking and cryptography are presented. Similarly, Line et al. [11] compare the security requirements between Smart Grid communication network and telecommunication networks. Then they list the overall cyber security challenges such as connectivity, trust models, security management, software vulnerabilities, consumers' privacy, and human factors. Solutions to these challenges are also suggested. Yan et al. [4] further suggest the cyber security requirements, vulnerabilities and solutions for Smart Grid communication networks. The security protocols adopted at each networking layer are given. Baig and Amoudi [7] classify the Smart Grid cyber attacks and countermeasures through five categories: SCADA, Smart Meter Attacks, Physical Layer Attacks, Data Injection and Replay Attacks and Network-based Attacks, which span home area networks, neighborhood networks, and wide area networks.
Another line of works focus on the security of a particular subsystem with Smart Grid. Cleveland [12] addresses the security requirements specifically for Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), which include confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation. Then the threats that may undermine these requirements are presented. Zhu et al. [13] present a taxonomy of cyber attacks on SCADA system. It first introduces the security requirements of SCADA system. Then categorize the attacks into attacks on hardware, attacks on software and attacks on communication stack. Deng and Shukla [14] survey the vulnerabilities and countermeasures specifically for the transmission subsystem [15] focus the survey of cyber security vulnerabilities on PMU network. The attacks are classified into four classes as in [16] : interruption, interception, modification, and fabrication. All the recent attacks against PMU network are grouped into the four categories. The countermeasures for each category of attacks are described. More recently, Komninos et al. [8] present a survey of smart grid security issues with a strong emphasis on the smart home environment and its interactions with the smart grid environment. The security objectives of smart grid and smart home are also illustrated, including integrity, confidentiality, availability, authenticity, authorization, and non repudiation. Based on these objectives, the attacks against smart home, smart grid and the interactions between the two are categorized. The countermeasures are also classified based on their abilities to ensure these objectives.
The related works are summarized in Table I . We notice that both lines of works usually organize the paper from the perspective of communication architecture and network layers, and the attacks and countermeasures described are centered around the requirements listed in [9] , such as integrity, confidentiality, availability, authenticity, authorization, and non repudiation, etc. For example, the attacks, such as man-inthe-middle attack and DoS attacks, and the countermeasures, such as authentication and key management, have almost been discussed in each of the above works.
III. SMART GRID OVERVIEW
A smart grid is an electrical grid that uses information and communications technology to gather and act on data to improve the efficiency, reliability, and sustainability of electric power. It is characterized by the two-way communications of data and control signal, large scale penetrations of renewable energy, and the complex interactions of distribution systems with distributed generators, energy markets, and customer behaviors. Specifically, a smart grid covers the following aspects of the power system [17] [18] [19] :
• The delivery infrastructure, such as circuit breakers, transmission and distribution lines, transformers, smart substations and sensors, etc.
• The end-user systems and related distributed-energy resources, such as renewable resources, loads, storage, and electrical vehicles, etc.
• The communication networks, such as remote measurement and control networks, inter-and intra-enterprise networks, and the Internet and Home Area Networks (HAN), etc.
• The management system at various levels of generation and delivery infrastructure, such as transmission and distribution control centers, regional reliability coordination centers, national emergency response centers and smart metering management system, etc.
• The financial and regulatory environment, such as stock and bond markets, government incentives, regulated and non-regulated rate of return, etc.
A. Overall Architecture
Currently, the design architectures and implementation models for smart grid are still evolving and not finalized. One of the most well known common reference model of smart grid is proposed by the U.S National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in [18] . A conceptual view of the NIST's smart grid reference model is depicted in Figure 1 . The NIST's model is composed of seven domains: generation, transmission, distribution, customers, markets, operations, and service providers. The two-way electrical flows are moving across the top four domains (power generation, transmission, distribution, and customer), which are controlled and managed by the bottom three domains (market, operations, and service providers) through communication flows. In addition, three typical customers are listed: Home Area Network (HAN), Building Area Network(BAN) and Industrial Area Network (IAN), where the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) takes place to monitor and manage the power and information flows through smart meters.
B. Key Subsystems 1) Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI):
AMI is viewed as a fundamental subsystem for smart grid and it is an integration of multiple technologies (smart meters, communication networks, and information management systems) that provides intelligent connections between consumers and system operators [20] . The deployment of AMI solutions are beneficial to both energy suppliers and end-use customers [21] . For the energy suppliers, AMI enables more efficient meter reading, less cost, and accurate outage localization. For the end-use customers, it provides the opportunity to reduce energy cost by participating real-time market pricing and demand response. The key technology of AMI is smart meter, which is a solid state programmable devices that can read real-time energy consumption as well as other operational data, such as voltage, phase angles, and frequencies, etc. [22] . Consisting of smart meters, AMI enables automated bidirectional data transfer between end-user meters and the grid operators, such that further data analysis and processing can be conducted to facilitate market pricing and operational controls. A conceptual notion of hierarchy in AMI where data are collected, processed, and analyzed to optimize smart grid benefits is depicted in Figure 2 [23] .
2) Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA): SCADA system is at the core of Smart Grid system and responsible for the real-time monitoring and control of power distribution [24] . It is deeply ingrained in the fabric of critical infrastructure sectors [13] . It is designed to have real-time system-wide data acquisition capabilities, allowing the control centers to gather all sorts of analog measurements and circuit breaker status data from the power system, in order to facilitate various security analysis, such as contingency analysis, corrective real and reactive power dispatch, etc. [25] . As the innovation of smart grid, the SCADA system is actively evolving, e.g., the smart grid control center is now able to acquire A typical SCADA system includes the following key components [27] :
• Control Servers: hosting control software and accessing subordinate control modules.
• Human-Machine Interface (HMI): the platform that allows operators to monitor the system states, change control settings, and manually override automatic control operations in the event of an emergency.
• Remote Terminal Unit (RTU): the field devices with wireless radio interfaces to conduct data acquisition and control.
• Programmable Logic Controller (PLC): the field devices to perform the logic control functions executed by electrical hardware.
• Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED): a smart sensor and actuator to acquire data, communicate to other devices, and perform local processing and control. As shown in Figure 3 , the control center holds the control server, the HMI, engineering workstations, and the data historian, which are all connected by a LAN and exposed through a router. It collects measurements and logs information from the field devices, visualize them to the HMI, and may generate actions based upon detected events. The wide area networks enable the communication protocols between the control center and the field sites, which are typically implemented using power/telephone line, cable, radio microwave and satellite.
3) Wide Area Measurement System: The traditional SCADA system use data from remote terminal units (RTUs) to provide information to system operators. However, the mechanism used to retrieve data from the devices is asynchronous and relative low [28] . To be able to monitor, operate and control power system in wide geographical area, Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) are deployed. The overall capability of WAMS is that data of the entire system can be obtained at the same time and the same place [29] . WAMS use a GPS satellite signal to time-synchronize from phasor measurement units (PMUs) at important nodes in the power system, send real-time phasor (angle and magnitude) data to a control center. The acquired phasor data provides dynamic information on power systems, which helps operators to initiate corrective actions to enhance the power system reliability. Table II shows a comparison between the RTUs of SCADA  and the PMUs of WAMS. WAMS usually holds a hierarchical networked architecture [30] , [31] , as shown in Figure 4 . In each area, a certain number of PMUs are installed in the bus substations of the power grid. In the middle level, there is a set of Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs). Each PDC can share information with the PDCs in neighborhoods through communication channels. In the top level, there is a WAMS center which collects information from PDCs supporting the system-wide monitoring task.
IV. DATA GENERATION SECURITY
The security and privacy of Smart Grid data sources are very crucial. In this section we focus on the security aspects of data generation in Smart Grid.
A. Data Sources in Smart Grid
The numerous data generated in Smart Grids belong to various types such as sensing or measurements data (e.g., energy consumption or generation measurements), command and control status information (e.g., power distribution or connection status), social and economics related knowledge (e.g., energy cost and pricing, demand).The data that get generated and collected in Smart Grid ecosystem is not only getting massive in size, but also extremely varied, based on pervasive data sources. The explosion in data reflects the fact that Smart Grid involves a very wide range of intelligent devices and assets spread across its distributed architecture. Overall the types of data sources in Smart Grid belong to the following three subsystem in Smart Grid: (i) power generation system; (ii) power transmission and distribution system ; (iii) load management system. The overview of all these data sources is summarized in Table III .
1) Data Sources in Power Generation:
• Solar power plants incorporate automatically measured solar irradiation data to achieve high photovoltaic performance. Data about plant status include yield reports about individual component performance, tracking of inverters or strings, alarm management [32] , [33] .
• Wind turbines convert wind's kinetic energy into electrical energy. These can be installed in open fields with enough wind speed or near the shore in the sea. The wind plants need long-term historical and short-term data about wind and wave parameters [33] , [34] .
• Hydroelectric plants continuously monitor silt content (quantity and size in PPM) and the operating conditions such as water level, temperature level, flow rate in order to diagnose the causes of fault or failure, and to determine replacement measures or residual life [35] .
• Marine turbines harness movement of the sea wave to generate electricity. The various data measured and used for stable operation and maintenance include longterm historical wave data from deep-water buoys as well as the power plant's site specific short-term wave data (measured using wave gauge that uses acoustic Doppler current profiler), energy yield, mechanical and electrical integrity measurements. The wave data include wave height, period, energy density, power per unit wave width [36] .
2) Data Sources in Power Transmission and Distribution:
• Phasor measurement unit (PMU) [37] [37] , [38] .
• Microgrids are local and decentralized electric grids that, based on situation (e.g., natural disaster), can disconnect from traditional electric grid for autonomous operations. Its measurement unit consists of interface circuit working with PT (Power Transformer) and CT (Current Transformer), conversion circuit for analog signal to digital data. The voltage and current measurements data at consumer side is acquired and used to control power system and calculate the electrical power consumption. The Historical Information System (HIS) provides archive to store power system historical data. This data is utilized to forecast both consumer load profile and power generation [39] , [40] .
• Fault detectors are critically important in Smart Grid for finding faults and taking actions to control failure spread. The devices consist of sensors to detect faults/ issues in power network, and intelligent switches to control the power flow in the network. The measurement data types include relay statistics, earth potential rise monitor data, soil thermal resistance monitor data, insulator leakage current monitor data, transmission line sag monitor data [41] , [42] .
3) Data Sources in Load Management:
• Smart Meters measure energy consumption in real-time, and communicate energy usage data between customers and their utility companies. Typically By July 2014, the number of smart meter installations in the U.S. exceeded very large scale of 50 million. These covered more than 43% of the U.S. homes, which is an increase from [43] , [44] . Smart Meters record electric usage readings at least every hour or less (e.g., every 15 minutes in many cases).
• Smart Appliances also play a very essential role in load management of Smart Grid. They allow flexible usage and operations in off-peak periods than peak hours, reducing peak and average electricity usage. Studies by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) [45] , [46] find that only 17% of U.S demand response potential is provided by residential customers. But with ongoing wide adoption of Smart Meters and Smart Appliances, the can be increased to 45%. The Smart Appliances generate data regarding measured energy consumption, and operate (among on, off or varied power level states) based on both user and the grid control commands.
• Electric Vehicles are bringing new perspectives for power consumption and storage in Smart Grid. The electric vehicle's data acquisition system [47] continuously measure and store varied data, such as: battery current, traction battery potential, ambient temperature, vehicle axle pulse counts, etc. EVs are the emerging source of large streams and archives of important and actionable data in Smart Grid.
B. Security in -Data Generation
In this subsection we elaborate security aspects in the discussed three categories of data sources in Smart Grid.
1) Data Source Security in -Power Generation:
Energy security is defined in [48] by the European Commission (EC) as "uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers (private and industrial)." The report by International Energy Agency (IEA) [49] has discussed renewable energy technologies and statistical analysis for assuring energy security. It is mainly focused on solutions to mitigate risks due to: physical security threats (can happen due to intentional attacks or weather events), technical system failures (e.g., outage such as blackouts and brownouts), energy market dynamics (due to economics, geopolitical and other factors). It assessed impacts of these different categories of risks in hydropower, solar photovoltaics (PV), concentrating solar power (CSP) plants, wind power, biomass combustion, geothermal power, and ocean energy.
A report in [50] has suggested detailed categorical measures in designing cyber security capability at the State level for energy assurance in Smart Grids. The report also stressed on the importance of information or data oriented security measures. According to the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA 2007), the first referenced characteristics of smart grid security is "Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric grid." The work in [51] analyzes various aspects of energy security for renewable energy systems. Based on work in [52] , this work has discussed an analytical framework to assess relationships between energy and security. It is divided into two branches: (a) energy system as an object exposed to security threats, and (b) energy system as a subject generating or enhancing insecurity. The first aspect include security of supply and security of demand. The second aspect include economic and political risk factors, technological risk factors, environmental risk factors.
2) Data Source Security in -Power Transmission and Distribution: The existence of interacting embedded devices is prevalent in power transmission and distribution system. From a general perspective, the work in [53] has addresses the overall security challenges in these embedded and hardware devices, which includes data provenance and integrity, trust management, identity management, and privacy. A generic layered Internet of Things (IoT) architecture is presented with the corresponding threat model. The threat model considers attacks on various layers: individual sensors, particular sensor nodes, actuators, gateway, federated infrastructure. For the data provenance and integrity, concept of Sensor Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is employed that merges sensing with cryptography. Unlike traditional PUF [54] (which produces response based on the challenge), Sensor PUF produces the response based on challenge as well as the sensed physical quantity. Sensor PUF can also be used in identity management by providing unique IDs. For trust management in legacy as well as low-cost systems, usage of hardware performance counters (HPCs) is suggested. The hardware performance counters are registers that can monitor certain events occurring during the lifetime of a program. Thus HPCs are present in all commodity processors. For privacy, light-weight encryption is suggested. In another work [55] , different physical attacks against sensing devices hardware is evaluated. The physical attacks are categorized with decreasing severity as follows: (i) gaining complete read/write access to the microcontroller; (ii) reading out RAM or flash memory, in whole or in part; (iii) influencing sensor readings; and (iv) manipulating radio communications. In the following, we specifically investigate the data source security within two embedded systems: Phasor Measurement Unit(PMU) and Microgrid. a) Securing PMUs: Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) is one of the most critical measurement devices in power transmission and distribution system. PMUs are prone to security and privacy attacks. A recent work in [15] has surveyed relevant works considering security vulnerabilities in PMU networks. The PMUs currently communicate typically with IEEE PMU communications standard C37.118 [56] . The protocol defines data conventions, measurement accuracies, and communications formats for synchrophasors or PMUs. Since the networked PMU data are reported to PDC through TCP/IP communication, it is prone to cyber-attacks. The attacks are generally classified into four categories as follows (based on [16] ): (a) interruption, (b) interception, (c) modification, and (d) fabrication. The authors have also discussed about corresponding countermeasure methods. The interruption attack include: physical attacks damaging the hardware or infrastructure (e.g., cutting a network connection between the PMU and PDC, sabotaging PMU); software attacks that affect hardware (e.g., Stuxnet); PMU Specific DoS or denial of service attack (the realtime measurement data services make PMU vulnerable to DoS attacks). The interception attack can be either passive with packet sniffing or can be active with manin-the-middle attack. The side-channel attack can also occur, extracting information by observing implementation artifacts. The modification attack tries to exploit some security vulnerabilities to corrupt, highjack or alter a legitimate process. Such attack include PMU specific insertion attacks such as malicious code injection and return-oriented programming. The fabrication attack involve creating fictitious asset or entity on the network, such as sending fabricated data across network through data spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks. Also future research direction and opportunity is indicated through security gateway system that is capable of neutralizing these attacks. The security gateway system can remove security vulnerabilities in the PMU -PDC -Super PDC network.
b) Securing microgrids: Microgrid is another key factor in increasing the electric grid reliability, the microgrid control systems are needed to be secure against adversarial attacks. The report in [57] has categorized the vulnerabilities in the microgrid control systems. There are two kinds of vulnerabilities: (i) vulnerabilities existing in traditional Internet Protocol (IP) network (control communications of data in microgrid happen commonly over IP networks); and (ii) vulnerabilities specific to Industrial Control System (ICS) systems. IP network specific vulnerabilities include following attacks: Denial of service (DoS), eavesdropping, man-in-themiddle (MITM), masquerading, message modification, message replay, traffic analysis, unauthorized access. The ICS specific vulnerabilities include various attacks as follows: attacks on field devices; backdoor or malicious software installed on command and control network; database attacks; devices with few or no security features; improper configuration of actors in ICS network; improper cyber-security procedures or training for internal and external personnel; improper or no network perimeter definition; improper or non-existent patching of software and firmware; insecure coding techniques; lack of ICS-specific mitigation technologies and security tools; lack of redundancy for critical actors; unauthorized personnel having access to ICS actors; vulnerabilities in common communication and control protocols in ICS. The report has then paired some national incident scenarios with the combination of vulnerabilities from the ones described above. Here are few examples. (A) The ICS operation was disrupted by delaying or blocking the flow of data through corporate or control networks. This had led to denial of availability of the networks to operators and causing information transfer bottlenecks or denial of service by information technology (IT)-resident services (such as domain name resolution). This was caused by a combination of DoS attack and improper or no network perimeter definition vulnerability. (B) Another national incident was false information being sent to ICS control operators either to disguise unauthorized changes or to initiate inappropriate actions by system operators. This was a combination of a number of attacks/vulnerabilities: database attack, improper or no network perimeter definition, MITM, message modification, message replay. Finally a microgrid threat model is proposed, which is more complete (i.e., not site or installation specific). This threat model integrates an architecturally driven model with a generic threat profile that integrates information from cyber-security issues and incidents in real-world control systems. Based on work on generic threat matrix in [58] , the threat levels (3 levels for high threat, 3 levels for medium threat, 2 levels for low threat) are categorized based on indicators of threat profile. The threat profile indicators are: intensity, stealth and time in "commitment" related issues; technical personnel, cyber, kinetic and access in "resource" related issues.
3) Data Source Security in -Load Management: Load management is one of the key functionalities in smart grid, enabled by the deployment of smart meters and electrical vehicles. Different approaches such as trust model, policy making, key management, and authentication schemes are employed to secure the data generation in these two devices. a) Securing smart meters: The work in [59] addresses issue of cyber-attacks against connected smart meters by proposing an independent, distributed and lightweight trust evaluation model. The trust model is implemented in two levels (individual smart meters and then collective nodes), which helps in detecting and isolating malicious nodes. The trust management process is based on three features: composition of trust components, aggregation of information from each component, formation of overall trust from collective trust components. The three major possible threats are considered: network availability, data integrity and information privacy. Another work in [60] has presented the security issues specifically for smart meters from the policy point of view. The authors address the issues in electricity fraud, privacy, strategic vulnerabilities and over-regulation, the conflict of interests. Policies and economics issues about smart meters in home area networks are listed. Key management system considerations for smart grid devices (including smart meters) is presented in [61] . Smart Grid device manufactures are increasingly deploying different encryption technologies to provide valuable properties like Confidentiality/ Integrity/ Availability (termed as CIA) of the data to ensure operations policy and compliance. Current vulnerability and threats to smart grid devices (including smart meters) are categorized as: consumer threats, naturally occurring threats (i.e., hazards), individual and organizational threats, impacts on consumers, impacts on availability, financial impacts, and likelihood of attack. There are various cryptosystems necessary to provide an end-toend turnkey CIA services, covering all layers of the protocol stack as well as cyber-physical boundaries. For testing such numerous cryptosystems, example testbed of networked smart meters is discussed in this work. The unique challenges in key management are presented as: effectively modeling security requirements and implementations, and managing keys and key distribution process.
b) Securing electric vehicles: The electric vehicles can support the new Smart Grid system dynamics, but as long as the security and privacy concerns are met. In this regard, the work in [62] proposes two authentication schemes to address the security and privacy issues of electric vehicles. The first authentication scheme is between the EV and a trusted Smart Grid server directly, while second authentication scheme is via a non-trusted third party entity with a robust privacy-preserving agenda. The electric power for the electrical vehicles is delivered to its area via the distribution network, based on the seven domains structure model presented in [9] . But the location of electrical vehicles can be in any of the following, referred to as Charging Points (CPs), Home Area Network (HAN), Building Area Network (BAN), Host, Industry Area Network (IAN), public infrastructure, and third party power station. Then the main challenge is to provide secured authentication for such transactions of EV charging in all those varied locations. This is complex because transactions in each of these location scenarios need to access a number of accounts for service credit and power charge debit. This is illustrated in Table IV .
C. Summary on Security of Data Generation
Finally we have summarized some of the key works about data generation security in Table V. V. DATA ACQUISITION SECURITY With such a large range of data sources and data types in Smart Grid ecosystem, the data acquisition process is also complex and varied. There are various communication technologies, protocols and standards being used for data acquistion at different levels in Smart Grid. Usually inside the home or other local facilities, there is ZigBee communication protocol for data collection. Then these facilities are connected to the Internet or the aggregator via wireless mesh networks (WMN), Internet protocol (IP) or powerline communication (PLC). Aggregator acts as collector of information about consumer loads demand and availability of distributed small-scale energy supplies, and then offering these distributed energy resources to the energy consumers. In another communication mode, the substations in Smart Grid connect to the Internet or the aggregator via Internet protocol (IP), powerline 
communication (PLC), or IEC (International Electrotechnical
Commission) standard protocol such as IEC 61850 [63] . These are illustrated in Figure 5 . In this section we present these methods and standards for data acquisition in Smart Grid, with a focus on security issues.
A. Communication Methods for Data Acquisition in Smart Grid
ZigBee communication protocol [64] [65] [66] is used in Smart Grid for wireless personal area network (WPAN) applications. It follows the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, and is designed for relatively low data rate communication among low-power devices in a small local area such as inside the home or building. Zigbee protocol stack consists of four layers: physical (PHY) sub-layer and the medium access control (MAC) sub-layer defined by IEEE 802.15.4, then the network layer and application layer. ZigBee has two device classes: full function device (FFD), and reduced function device (RFD). FFD can perform all the tasks defined by ZigBee, while RFD can perform only limited tasks. FFD can form any topology and become a network coordinator (responsible for overall network management). RFD is limited to star topology and consume low power. ZigBee has following components or entities defined: coordinator, end device, router, ZigBee trust center (ZTC), and ZigBee gateway. The packet frame structure in IEEE 802.15.4/ ZigBee communication is illustrated in Figure 6 . The preamble consists of 32 bits for synchronization purpose. The PSDU (PHY Service Data Unit) size ranges from 0-127 Bytes and consists of PC (for addressing mode flags), ADDR (for address information), DSN (Data Sequence Number), Link Layer PDU, and CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check).
Wireless [67] has surveyed the wireless communication technologies based on following performance requirements in Smart Grid data collection: latency, data rate, resilience, security, distance, scalability.
IEC 61850 [68] , [69] is a object-oriented communication protocol defining communication across Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). It is mainly focused on communication for electric substation automation. IEC 61850 provides a comprehensive model for enabling easy organization of data in power system devices, with the support of consistency across device types and plug-and-play capability. The core parts of IEC 61850 include following: Substation Configuration Language (SCL), Abstract Communications Service Interface (ACSI) and base types, Common Data Classes (CDC), Logical Nodes, Specific Communications Service Mappings (SCSM) with MMS and ethernet, sampled values over ethernet, conformance testing. The standard has defined data types to be transmitted for each logical device, with object name, data class name (data structure), data description, mandatory/ optional preference.
Power Line Communication (PLC) [70] , [71] is wired communications technology that uses power transmission conductor line to transmit data. It provides lower cost than wireless communication modes because it utilizes already existing power line infrastructure. There are 3 classes of PLC communication technology: broadband, narrowband, and ultra narrowband. The broadband provides up to 200 Mbps data rate and is applicable to residential AMI (advanced metering infrastructure)/ AMR (automatic meter reading), but not suitable for sub-stations. The narrowband provides up to 500 kbps data rate and is applicable to sub-station communications. The ultranarrowband provides up to 100 bps and is applicable to AMI, AMR, Demand Response (for direct load control purpose).
In summary, the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) report [72] has suggested communication parameter needs for various Smart Grid functionalities. This is illustrated in 
B. Security in -Data Acquisition
Data Acquisition is a very essential function in Smart Grid for monitoring varied states of entities such as power consumption, load balancing, resource allocation, etc. The Smart Grid data are collected very frequently to support smart electricity distribution, consumption and management. But this also introduces new security and privacy challenges.
1) Secure Data Collection and Aggregation:
The non-IP based networks deployed in utility power grids are limited in communication and security capability. The largely distributed data generating sensors around Smart Grid architecture are typically constrained (in terms of computation, memory, communication bandwidth), requiring scalable and secure transport and data collection protocols design. The work in [73] has proposed SSTP, a scalable and light-weight transport protocol over power grid wide area network. It supports lifetime-lived, secure and reliable sensor data delivery, by exploiting the notion of state-token. The state-token is issued with each server message and attached to corresponding client message subsequently delivered to the server. The work has also compared different transport protocol based on different features. SSTP has been proved to significantly reduce computation and memory overhead, compared to the existing transport protocols.Secure and scalable data collection protocol for Smart Grid is proposed in [74] and [75] , containing a hierarchical architecture consisting of measurement devices, data collectors, and power operator. The measurement devices encrypt generated data, the data collectors relay those data from the measurement devices to power operator. While the data collectors can verify the data integrity, they cannot access the content of the data, thus preserving data confidentiality. This feature removes the requirements of trusted or honest-but-curious data collectors from the data collection model. The authors further extend this work in [76] by coupling the secure data collection requirements with objective of time minimization, such that the total data collection time is reduced while ensuring confidentiality of data. In [77] , the time minimization objective is specifically studied within a tree-based smart grid data collection environment. Another work in [78] has proposed a secure data transmission scheme based on compressive sensing. Only simple linear operations are required in the encryption process. The proposed scheme can achieve perfect secrecy under certain conditions.
2) Privacy Preserving Data Collection and Sharing:
A number of works have proposed and designed privacypreserving frameworks and policies for data sharing in Smart Grid. As the business model in Smart Grid gets a transformation, business other than utilities might even sell electricity or collect energy usage/ production data directly from consumers [79] . Utilities may also get into new services outside traditional power distribution and provision. This motivations increasing risks of privacy violation within Smart Grid. The work in [80] has summarized privacy policies, laws, regulations and standards in this regard. The corresponding privacy-enhancing schemes such as encryption, steganography, aggregation methodologies, de-identification methodologies, access control systems, and privacy seals for Websites are discussed. The newest privacy conduct code from the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) is available in [81] .
First, the work in [82] has proposed a privacy-protected smart meter data collection scheme. The original data are homomorphic encrypted to protect users' privacy. Proposed scheme is able to check the correctness of the collected data by directly examining the homomorphic-encrypted ones instead of the original ones, such that the users' privacy is preserved while data correctness is ensured. Another work in [83] addresses the issue of privacy protection where individual smart meter measurements are kept secret from outsiders (including the utility provider itself), while processing private measurements under encryption. The authors first list the involved parties in a smart meter scenario and the smart metering architecture. Then they use total energy consumption as the aggregation function, and compare different privacy-preserving approaches to implement the aggregation function. Finally, challenges related to hardware limitations, security cryptographic protocols and signal processing are discussed.
Moreover, grid users and standardization committees usually prevent the utilities and third parties from collecting aggregated meter data at the household granularity. Data perturbation is a technique used to provide a trade-off between the privacy of individuals and the precision of the aggregated measurements. The work in [84] presents an interesting decisional attack on aggregation with data perturbation. It shows that it is possible to detect the presence or absence of an individual's data inside an aggregate by exploit the temporal correlation within the measurements. Similarly, the work in [84] has considered a decisional attack on data aggregation with data-perturbation, showing that a curious entity can exploit the temporal correlation of Smart Grid measurements to detect presence or absence of individual data generated by a specific user, inside the aggregate. Another work in [85] has proposed an efficient and privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme, by using a superincreasing sequence to structure multidimensional data and encrypting the structured data by the homomorphic paillier cryptosystem. For data communications from user to Smart Grid operation center, data aggregation is performed directly on ciphertext at local gateways, without decryption. Finally, there are also relevant works in the literature for assuring privacy while sharing smart meter data. The work in [86] has proposed a privacy-preserving data sharing method to prevent stakeholders from obtaining identifiable smart metering data, while still enabling them to perform their respective functions. The authors first introduce a data sanitization-based mechanism to protect sensitive information before sharing data for external usage. Then they present solutions based on secure multi-party computing to enable the third parties to perform aggregation operations on smart metering data in a privacy-preserving manner. Another work in [87] presents a privacy-preserving framework for the analysis of sensor data from smart homes. The authors propose an approach to achieve data privacy throughout the complete data cycle including: data generation, transfer, storage, processing and sharing. The main objective of the privacy preservation is to ensure that private information remains protected, while processing or releasing data.
The key discussed works about data acquisition security are summarized in Table VII . 
VI. DATA STORAGE SECURITY IN SMART GRID
Data storage is one of the most vital components in the Smart Grid ecosystem for assuring a number of services and functionalities (such as grid failure detection -isolationrestoration, demand-response, prediction of energy generation, micro-grids, customer analysis and billing etc.). The data from very broad range of sources are needed to be stored in a systematic manner for efficient and contextual retrieval. These data are needed to be queried and retrieved meaningfully for processing and analysis for intelligence extraction.
A. Methods and Practices for Data Storage
Cloud-based data storage and analysis has become largely popular in Smart Grids due to advantages like performance, scalability, availability and interoperability, facilitating data analysis both in real-time and long-term historical. As illustrated in Figure 7 the different components of cloud-based data storage systems for Smart Grid are: data center facilities, data storage arrays, storage area network, server platforms, database, and virtualization of server or storage or network devices. While a number of these components are infrastructure or maintenance related, the database is very important component requiring more design efficiency and security protection. The maintenance and operations in Smart Grid database consists of standard data management operations such as: schema or format creation, data insertion with update and delete routines, data query and contextual information retrieval, performance optimization of data retrieval, data access control, backup and recovery. But recently NoSQL (Not only SQL) based post-relational database systems are being adopted for Smart Grid database, such as: document-oriented database (e.g., MongoDB), XML database (e.g., BaseX), graph database (e.g., InfiniteGraph), key-value store (e.g., Apache Cassandra), multi-value database (e.g., OpenQM), object-oriented database (e.g., db4o), RDF (resource description framework) database (e.g., Meronymy SPARQL), tabular database (e.g., BigTable), tuple database (e.g., Jini), column-oriented database (e.g., c-store). Moreover, the parallel and distributed file systems are getting increasingly popular in Smart Grid database design, due to large-scale, distributed and geographically scattered nature of Smart Grid resources. Most popular distributed file system include Apache Hadoop and Google MapReduce. These database types are also illustrated in Figure 8 . Database management for Smart Grids is discussed in detail in [88] .
Different database designs and configurations need to be aware of data types and operations specific to the application domain. In this regard the work in [89] has presented a survey of Smart Grid data operations in cloud-based system. Specific properties of Smart Grid data are discussed: heterogeneity of device types, interfaces and capabilities; time-stamped; high data generation rate; unboundedness of data streams; evolving nature with temporal locality and structural breaks; unordered data streams (not always following the order of data generation). Smart Grid stream data analysis in cloud-based systems are observed to be requiring following basic set of operations: storage, indexing, aggregation, clustering, sampling, searching, and auditing. Now we briefly discuss some application/ service specific data management system in Smart Grid. The work in [90] has addressed a series of system architectures to store and process smart meters reading data. These different data management architectures are classified based on following components: Concentrator Node (CN) and Central Data Processing Node (CDPN). The Concentrator Node (CN) gathers, stores and returns electricity consumption information from multiple smart meters. The Central Data Processing Node (CDPN) manages the CNs. While operations of CNs are more passive (receiving and executing queries), CDPNs are active with highest level of control. CDPNs are responsible for managing and coordinating tasks assigned to CNs, and also calculating electricity consumption statistics and monthly billing information. Now based on configuration of CNs and CDPNs, there are following four architectures for smart meter data storage and management: (i) single relational database (one CDPN, a set of CNs, and one Relational Database Management System or RDBMS located at the CDPN); (ii) distributed relational database (an RDBMS per CN for parallel database access); (iii) key-value distributed database (storing all monthly readings for each household into a single row, instead of writing a database row per smart meter; the single row of readings consist of a household identifier and an xml structured string); and (iv) hybrid storage (combination of one CDPN with a single RDBMS database and a set of CNs with their local File Systems). Another work in [91] has presented the IBM storage infrastructure for smart grid data management. The work also emphasizes data security issues and compliance with the North American Electric Reliability Corporations's (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program.
B. Security in -Data Storage

1) Security Factors for Cloud-Based Data Storage:
Largescale spatial temporal data storage in Smart Grids mostly require and use cloud-based distributed architecture. Therefore Smart Grid data storage also has those fundamental security and privacy challenges as in cloud-based data storage. The work in [92] has surveyed existing works for following data storage security objectives within cloud-based platform: data integrity, data confidentiality, and data availability. Another work in [93] has analyzed security and privacy issues in Smart Grids software architecture operating on different cloud environments. Due to various services in Smart Grids there is much less opportunity to compress information through aggregation, before storing them, causing data bloat.
There are a number of federal and state regulations (e.g., guidelines in [94] ) regarding Smart Grid data storage, in order to protect consumer data and assure transparency about energy pricing. Long-term analysis of historical data in Smart Grids need longer duration of data preservation. But this brings a number of unique challenges such as: security codes and privacy policies evolving over time; large-scale data migration between cloud vendors when original vendor is unable to continue service (also bringing issues in migrating security and privacy policies); simultaneous local and global context bringing multiple jurisdiction issues in protecting data and enforcing mechanisms.
2) Security Factors for Data Storage on Field Deployed Devices:
Malware protection and secure access issues for field deployed devices in Smart Grid are discussed in [95] . Importance of both secure software development and secure software upgrade are discussed. The predominant method for secure storage is use of keying mechanism for validation. Typically the device is configured with public key of a secure signing server. With this key, the device can validate any newly downloaded software prior to running it or new batch of data access. This proactive approach can provide higher levels of assurance.
3) Access Control and Authentication: The different access control and authentication mechanisms in Smart Grid are discussed in [96] . Role-based access control (RBAC) can enhance the system reliability and can eliminate potential security threats. The different user roles in Smart Grid include operators, engineers, technicians, managers, etc. These roles have different access privileges to grid devices, the stored data, and system functionalities. The work in [97] has proposed smartgrid role-based access control (SRAC) model. In the model, users role hierarchy and role constraints are predefined. An XML-based security policy managing method is designed. For authentication, the work in [98] has proposed a lightweight two-step mutual authentication protocol by combining the public key encryption scheme and Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme. The works in [98] and [99] are based on public key cryptography. Public key infrastructure (PKI) is a classic public key management system, where users obtain certificates (including public keys) from pre-defined certificate authorities (CAs), and the CAs belong to a hierarchical structure. In Smart Grid with PKI, each grid device obtains a certificate from a local CA. Two grid devices belonging to the same regional network may have their certificates issued by different CAs, and they will not recognize each other's certificate.
Another work in [100] has discussed how unauthorized access and malicious codes can affect Smart Grid data storage security. In the U.S., there are requirements, policies and regulatory issues pre-defined by the NERC, NIST and DOE [101] . But there are alarming evidence that an adversary can manage to get critical access to the network data stored in a Smart Grid related database and can even manipulate the stored data [100] , [102] . These can lead to compromise and failure spread in Smart Grid infrastructure. In this regard the Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is a power system analysis tool which is widely adopted in the control centres. The OPF operations are highly dependent on network configuration data and data measured from SCADA system. The interruption in power systems due to the malicious modification of Smart Grid stored data is discussed in [102] . A method based on Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is proposed to detect anomalies relevant to this kind of attacks. This method is applied in IEEE benchmark test systems and has shown significant impact on false alarm reduction.
C. Summary on Security of Data Storage
Finally in Table VIII we have summarized some of the key discussed works on Smart Grid data storage security.
VII. DATA PROCESSING SECURITY IN SMART GRID
In this section, we focus on security challenges within data processing phase, where the data are actually used for applications. Specifically, we investigate the security issue from the perspectives of three well known Smart Grid applications: demand response, state estimation and energy theft detection.
A. Demand Response
Demand Response (DR) is a fundamental aspect of smart grid that gains relevance when smart metering and advanced communications infrastructures among different elements of the grid are in place. In smart grids, a demand response management strategy utilizes smart metering data and pricing signals, and alters the energy consumption patterns of enduser customers in timing or level, in response to changes in the price of electricity over time [103] . For utility companies, demand response motivates changes in electricity use and induces lower system load at times when grid reliability is jeopardized, and helps to stabilize volatile electricity prices in regions with centrally organized wholesale electricity markets. For end-use customers, demand response enables them not only to reduce their bills, but also use energy more efficiently by turning off and on an appliance in accordance with the environmental requirements. Demand response basically falls into two categories: load control techniques and pricing policies. In load control approach, the residential users agree to transfer their energy consumption control to the utility, while pricing policies provide incentives for the users to adjust their energy usage according to a global optimization constraints. 1) OpenADR: OpenADR, developed by the OpenADR Alliance, is a set of standards and open data exchange models to facilitate the automated demand response between service provides and consumers [104] . The OpenADR specifications defines various XML-based messages that can be exchanged over any IP-based network using protocols such as HTTP, SOAP or XMPP [105] . It is expected to be a dominating mechanism for at least next 10 years, contributing to lower product development costs [106] . Figure 9 is a generic OpenADR architecture [107] . It consists of the Demand Response Automation Server (DRAS) and the DRAS Client. As shown, the data flow in OpenADR architecture is typically in five steps [107] :
• 1. The utility company defines DR event and price signals to send to DRAS. • 2. DR event and price services are published on DRAS.
• 3. DRAS clients, which can be either a client and logic with integrated relay (CLIR) or a Web service will request event data from the DRAS every minute. 
2) Security Issues and Requirements:
In [105] , the general security guidelines specifically for demand response process are listed:
• Confidentiality: Demand response is naturally a distributed decision making problem, in which each of the utility companies and customers only has partial information of the entire decision making problem and they need to negotiate with one another to reach a global consensus. The negotiations among the decision makers are through sharing and exchanges of privacy-sensitive data, which may include: smart meter measurements, billing and personal information, demographic data, etc. Confidentiality ensures that these data is encrypted during the network transmission as well as in the storage, to prevent unauthorized access and privacy violation.
• Integrity: Demand response requires accurate energy consumption, price signals and event information. The manipulations of these data could result in grid instability and even blackout. The integrity of these data should be protected during communications.
• Availability: Demand response, especially fast-DR, requires timely information sharing between utility companies and end-use customers. Thus, the real time availability of information like energy demand, is crucial.
• Authentication: It has to be guaranteed that only an legitimate party can issue DR event signals.
• Non-repudiation: Verifiable evidences about the transactions between utility companies and end-use customers should be kept.
• Auditing and Logging: Reliable auditing has to be conducted by employing the secure logs of events and sensitive operations.
3) Secure Demand Response Schemes:
In this part, we overview the existing schemes to enhance demand response security.
We first address the works that intend to preserve privacy. Liang et al. [108] apply homomorphic encryption to the demand aggregation process within the proposed dynamic pricing scheme to achieve privacy-preserved demand response. Similarly, Li et al. [109] present EPPDR, another privacy-preserving demand response scheme. This scheme also employs a homomorphic encryption to the energy demand aggregation process. Differently, an adaptive key evolution technique is further incorporated such that the privacy preservation of forward secrecy of users' session keys and the evolution of users' private keys, are also implemented. The computation and communication overhead to achieve forward secrecy in EPPDR are evaluated to demonstrate its better performance in comparison with existing techniques. As an alternative approach, Zhu [110] formulates demand response games for demand allocation and shedding, and propose corresponding distributed privacy preserving algorithms based on secure multi-party computation. The existence of Nash equilibrium and the algorithms' convergence are presented. The authors consider the privacy preserving against semi-honest adversaries, who attempt to infer private information from the received messages. Both proposed algorithms are resilient against at most N-2 adversaries, which means that in a game with N players, even if there are as many as N-2 adversary players, the private information of the left 2 legitimate players can still be protected.
Preserving grid stability is another key concern for secure demand response. Maharjan et al. [111] formulate a Stackelberg game between utility companies and consumers to achieve distributed and dependable demand response management. First, the intrinsic distributed nature of the proposed algorithm is resilient to the failure or noncooperation of any player, such that the global equilibrium can always be achieved to maximize each one's benefit. Second, the authors shows that the algorithm will converge to the global equilibrium with only local information available, which means each player doesn't have to expose private sensitive energy consumption and generation information to others. Last but not least, the paper is the first to study and evaluate the impact of cyber attacks on demand response management system, from the perspectives of both the economic aspect and the physical aspect. The attacker intends to create monetary and physical damage by manipulating the price information between the utility companies and consumers. Countermeasure based on individual reserve power and common reserve power are proposed to avoid the physical damage. Nguyan et al. [112] illustrate the error-prone nature of collaborate demand response, due to users' erratic behavior, limited commitments, device insecurity, and possible misconfigurations. To assure the safety of demand response under these contingencies, the propose approach incorporates a real-time secure assessment module before the load management process, which adopts timesto-being-unsafe (TTBU), the minimum remaining time until the grid becomes unsafe as the safety metric. As a result, the load management process is divided into two phases to assure the safety: a load curtailment phase and a load shedding phase. When TTBU drops below a warning threshold, the system enters the load curtailment phase to induce customers to decrease consumptions collaboratively. If the curtailment is not fully realized by the customer and the TTBU drops to an emergent threshold, the system enters the load shedding phase, which simply shutdown a subset of loads to prevent further failures. 
B. State Estimation
State estimation is a key system monitoring process deployed in power system control center to estimate the system unknown state variables based on the collected meter measurements [25] . The outputs of state estimation lay the foundation for a series of subsequent critical control processes, such as contingency analysis, security constrained economic dispatch, and real-time pricing in electrical market, etc. Therefore, the safety of state estimation process is a key concern in Smart Grid cyber security. Traditionally, the state estimation process is formulated as a static weighted-least-square (WLS) problem and solved in a centralized control center, which need to collect all the measurements through SCADA system across the entire network [25] . Liu et al. [113] first introduce the concept of false data injection attacks against state estimation, which opens up a brand new perspective to attack the process. Inspired by the work in [113] , a series of further developments are made in [114] [115] [116] [117] , etc. This kind of attacks mainly expose and rely on the vulnerabilities of the traditional centralized weighted-least-square state estimation model and its corresponding bad data detection method. Meanwhile, Smart Grid is characterized by the intermittent renewable power generations and frequent grid topology changes, and the unprecedentedly large amount of data generated in real time by the new measurement devices like phasor measurement units (PMUs). The traditional static WLS state estimation model is not suitable to capture the system dynamics in real time and the centralized online data processing is even practically infeasible due to the communication bottleneck. Therefore, new state estimation methods should be proposed not only just as countermeasures against false data injection attacks, but also as new approaches to process the measurement data in more timely and robust way. In this section, recent resilient state estimation methods are presented, which can be categorized into two major classes: methods employing distributed architecture, and methods adopting new models. Figure 10 gives the taxonomy of resilient state estimators we have covered.
1) Distributed State Estimation:
Distributed state estimators mainly still employ the traditional static WLS formulation. Differently, they partition the power network into several control regions, and distribute the computation and bad data detection requirements among these local control centers, to increase the online measurement processing capabilities and bad data detection sensitivity. Each local control center only has knowledge of local measurements and network structure, and iteratively coordinate the local state estimates with other control centers to achieve the global state convergence.
Pasqualetti et al. [118] employs the traditional centralized WLS state estimation model and distribute the computation among local control centers using two interaction structures: the incremental interaction and the diffusive interaction. In incremental interaction, the estimated result flows in a sequential manner from one control center to another. In diffusive interaction, each control center communicates with all its neighbors. Although both interaction structures have proofed convergence to the centralized WLS solution, local observability is required, which means the local Jacobian matrix after partition must be full rank. Xie et al. [119] and Kekatos and Giannakis [120] respectively propose distributed methods which don't require local observability. In [119] , a first order adaptive diffusion-based algorithm is presented, which combines a local descent step with a diffusion step. In [120] , the well known alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is employed. As further improvement, [121] proposes a robust and fully decentralized adpative re-weighted state estimation scheme, which essentially a generalization of the Gossip based Gauss-Newton algorithm. It demonstrates faster convergence speeds and is completely adaptable to measurement meter failures and communication network failures.
All the above distributed state estimation methods are accompanied by the corresponding distributed bad data detection techniques. These distributed models decrease the chance of success of false data injection attacks, since they can incorporate more meter measurements and divide the whole network into smaller and more observable regions, but are not specifically designed for false data attack detections. Wang et al. [122] particularly propose a false data injection attack detection scheme based on extended distributed state estimation (EDSE). The whole network is partitioned into several regions using graph partition algorithms and each region also incorporates the adjacent buses and tie lines. By this approach, the detection sensitivity is dramatically increased, such that the false data stands out distinctively from normal observation errors in the chi-square test. Sedghi and Jonckheere [123] propose a decentralized false data injection detection scheme by creating Markov graph of the bus phase angles. Power network topology is learned by the conditional covariance test. It shows that in normal conditions, the Markov graph should be consistent with the power network topology, such that a discrepancy between the calculated Markov graph and the learned topology will indicate a false data injection attack. The set of the malicious meters can be determined without any extra hardware resources.
Although distributed state estimators are proposed as the future state estimation alternative to enhance performance as well as resilience, they are not flawless. Recent work in [124] particularly addresses the security vulnerabilities within distributed state estimation. The authors show that by compromising the communication links of a single control center in a interconnected system, an attacker could launch a denial-of-service attack to blind the monitoring of every region. In [125] , false data injection attacking strategies are even specifically designed against distributed state estimation model in [120] . These indicate how to design a secure distributed state estimation model is still quite challenging.
2) New Formulations for State Estimation: Traditional static WLS formulation for state estimation has the limitation in the presence of bad data [126] and lacks the ability to produce real-time snapshot of the highly dynamic Smart Grid system. To overcome these issues, other formulations for state estimation problem are proposed.
Gol and Abur [127] present the feasibility of Least Absolute Value (LAV) estimator for robust state estimation when PMU measurements are employed. The least absolute value (LAV) estimator is traditionally known to be more robust than the WLS estimator in the presence of bad data, and the bad data can be rejected automatically due to their produced large normalized residuals. However, since the traditional measurements for state estimation only include bus power injections, branch power flows and bus voltage magnitudes, the formulated LAV estimator would require extremely high computational cost to find the solution. Therefore, the WLS estimator is widely adopted instead of LAV. Gol and Abur [127] suggest that with the help of PMU measurements, which are the voltage and current phasor measurements, the estimation problem is linearized and LAV estimator would demonstrate competitive computational performance with WLS while preserving its robustness.
The penetration of renewables and sudden changes in the load, generation and topology make the Smart Grid system much more dynamic. To cope with such dynamics, a new line of researches about dynamic state estimators are motivated, to facilitate the major needs for robust online state estimation. One solution is to employ Kalman Filters. Weng et al. [128] propose a new Kalman filter based state estimation method, which first use historical data to conduct maximum likelihood parameter estimation, then use the estimated parameters with online measurements to estimate the system state. The Kalman filter is employed in a physically meaningful kernel feature space, such that missing data can be tolerated. A similar approach is proposed in [129] , which combines Kalman filters with real-time PMU data. The authors introduce a novel state estimator, viz. adaptive Kalman Filter with inflatable noise variances, and suggest its resilience against wrong system modeling and bad data injection through extensive simulations. To further improve the robustness of state estimator against topology changes, bad data and malicious attacks, the authors in [130] introduce a robust data-driven state estimator. Specifically, the state estimator first uses historical state and system topology to cope with topology changes, then historical data are employed to remove the bad data. Subsequently, to identify a malicious attack, a maximum agreement algorithm is executed upon collected states. Finally, the resulting information is used in a kernel ridge regression process within Bayesian inference framework, which leads to a highly robust data-driven state estimator. However, this estimator suffers a large computational overhead. To accommodate online data processing, dimension reduction and k-dimensional tree indexing are utilized to speed up the process. As a most recent alternative approach, Chavali and Nehorai [131] propose a dynamic robust state estimator based using Factor Graphs. They model the power system as a factor graph, in which the state vectors corresponding to each area at each time are considered as factor nodes. The dependencies between state vectors and their neighbor area vectors, and the dependencies between state vectors at different times, are captured into the factor graph. This state estimation method is naturally distributed since the sum-product message passing algorithm on factor graphs are distributed. Since the factor graph can capture the nonlinear relations, this state estimator introduces less errors than the traditional extended Kalman filter based methods, in which nonlinear power system measurement model is approximated as a linear model. The authors further suggest that the proposed method is more robust to bad data, since once an area has bad data, the weights corresponding to the state samples in that area will become very small.
Another interesting idea we have found is in [132] . The authors measure the robustness of the estimator by the worse case mean square error, and seek to construct an optimal robust estimator based on the attackers' ability to launch data integrity attacks. A Minimax Optimization problem is formulated, which intends to minimize the mean square error resulted from the most destructive attack. A very important issue we have captured from this work is: for state estimators, the concept of robustness and security should be distinguished from each other. In other words, a robust estimator may not necessarily be secure. This suggests that future research about state estimators should have clear definitions of robustness and security, and the corresponding assessment standards and methodologies would also be indispensable.
C. Energy Theft Detection
Energy theft is a notorious security problem in power systems, which causes significant economic losses and threatens grid stability. Due to the ease of intrusion and economic benefits [133] , energy theft is a widespread practice. In developing countries, up to 50 percent of electricity is acquired via theft [134] . In United States, the utility companies lose approximately six billion dollars per data due to this problem [135] . Energy theft can be caused by physical and cyber attacks, such as directly connecting loads to the electricity distribution lines, hacking and reprogramming smart meters, etc. The detection of energy theft has traditionally been addressed through physical checks of tamper-evident seals by field personnel with balance meters [136] . As the high-resolution data collection from smart meters in AMI, utility companies are now able to timely gather more data from these devices and employ analytics to turn these data into actionable information, such as detecting energy theft and abnormal consumption trends. Jiang et al. [137] specifically summarize the energy theft detection schemes by detectors, such as classification based, state estimation based and game theory based. Here we adopt the data-driven perspective, which categorize the approaches into single data source based, multiple data source based and privacy-preserving data source based. Figure 11 gives the taxonomy of energy theft detection approaches we have covered.
1) Single Data Source:
The single data source based approaches only employ the smart meter data in AMI. Cardenas et al. [138] use the fine-grained anomaly detection from smart meters and formulate the problem as a game between the electric utility and the electricity thief. The Nash equilibrium of the game is a probability density function that both parties have to choose when reporting AMI measurements. The goal of the electricity thief is to steal a predefined amount of electricity while minimizing the likelihood of being detected, while the electric utility wants to maximize the probability of detection. Mashima and Cárdenas [139] propose a new threat model that could be used either by adversarial classification and adversarial learning, and evaluate the threat model on several detectors including Average Detector, ARMR-GLR, nonparametric statistics, unsupervised learning (Local Outlier Factor). In [140] , the smart meter data are integrated within the state estimation process, and the amount of energy stolen by a smart meter is modeled as a measurement bias. As a result, a weighted least square based state estimation approach can be applied to detect the energy thefts, in which a zero bias represents a truthful smart meter.
2) Multiple Data Sources: Recently works about energy theft detection tend to employ the data from multiple data sources, which are the multiple data source based approaches. Reference [141] proposes AMIDS, an AMI intrusion detection system that uses information fusion to combine the sensors and consumption data from smart meters to detect energy theft. AMIDS combines meter audit logs of physical and cyber events with consumption data to model and detect energy theft. It differs previous works by evaluating multiple AMI data sources under a combination of techniques. It uses an attack graph based information fusion technique to combine collected information from three data sources: cyber-side network and host-based intrusion detection system, on-meter antitampering sensors, and power measurement-based anomalous consumption detectors. Reference [142] proposes a temperature dependent predictive model which uses both smart meter data and data from distribution transformers to detect electricity theft. Load profile analysis of customers to detect abnormal energy consumption pattern. These methods cannot be used where there is complete bypass of meters. Technical losses and energy theft are accurately calculated using the energy balance between the energy supplied from the distribution transformer and the energy consumption reported by the users. Another work in [143] presents a novel consumption patternbased energy theft detector (CPBETD), which leverages the predictability property of customers' normal and malicious consumption patterns. By employing transformer meters as well as smart meters, the total consumption of each neighborhood is measured, and is compared with the total amount of energy consumption reported by the smart meters. If energy theft is detected at this level, for each customer in the suspicious area, a multiclass support vector machine is trained using historic data as well as synthetic attack data set. The classifier is then used to decide whether a new sample reported by the customer is tampered or not.
3) Privacy-Preserving Data Sources: Since the smart meter data contain sensitive users' energy profile information, conducting energy theft detection while preserving data source privacy draws great attention to another line of research works recently. Reference [144] is the first to investigate the energy theft detection problem considering users' privacy issues. Previous schemes all require users to send their private information, e.g., load profiles or meter reading at certain times to the utility companies, which invades users' privacy. This paper utilizes peer-to-peer computing, and propose three distributed algorithms to solve a linear system of equations (LSE) for user's honesty coefficients. The users' privacy can be preserved because they do not need to disclose any of their energy consumption data to others. The propose privacy-preserving distributed LU and QR decomposition to solve a linear system of equations, which adaptively account for both constant and variable honesty coefficients. The work in [145] also achieves privacy preserving by proposing a centralized energy theft detection scheme using the Kalman filter, called SEK. Based on SEK, it develops a privacy-preserving distributed energy theft scheme called PPBE, which privately finds the energy thieves by decomposing the Kalman filter into two parallel and loosely coupled filters. The main idea is to model the amount of energy stolen by a smart meter as a measurement bias, and use optimal state estimation techniques to solve for all the meters' biases. A zero bias indicates a faithful meter. One filter (bias-ignorant filter) estimates the state variable vector and the other filter (bias filter) estimate the bias vector. The bias-ignorant filter first conducts state estimation in a private and distributed manner, such that users' measurements are hidden from the system operators to preserve privacy. The resulted residual will be further employed by the system operator to carry out bias filter. The privacy preserving energy theft detection would be a promising research direction in the future.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYTICS IN SMART GRID
From the security perspective, data in Smart Grid are both the problem and the solution. On one hand, as suggested in previous sections, the security and privacy of the big data in Smart Grid are among the most challenging issues for Smart Grid innovation. On the other hand, big data analytics also holds the big promises for solving Smart Grid security problems. By exploiting the historical and real time data in Smart Grid, system operators are able to uncover hidden relationships, improve situational awareness, discover patterns and facts about security threats, and predict and even prevent the potential new issues before they occur. All these related techniques are called security analytics, i.e., the application of big data analytics techniques to cyber security [146] . As suggested in [147] , in the next three to five years, security analytics will disrupt the status quo in most information security product segments and evolve to enable a wide range of security intelligence with advanced predictive capabilities and automated real-time controls, which are also called data-driven security or intelligence-driven security.
The applications of data analytics for power system security is not new [148] . However, in Smart Grid, as the massive amounts of data generation and increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks, the traditional security solutions are rapidly rendered obsolete. For example, traditional security solutions are not working since 97% of breaches led to compromise within days or less, of which 72% leading to data exfiltration in the same time [149] . Figure 12 describes the evaluation of data analytics in security [149] . Specifically, the security analytics in Smart Grid should meet the following requirements [147] , [149] :
• Diverse data sources: leveraging multiple data sources and creating a synergistic learning effect as new securityrelated information becomes available.
• Big data infrastructure: employing a fast and scalable infrastructure to conduct real time and long term analysis.
• High performance analytics engine: being capable of processing large volumes of data in real time to detect, investigate and prioritize threats.
• Integrated intelligence: supporting recommendations and decision making.
• Comprehensive visibility: visualizing the trends and events effectively with appropriate normalization. In this section, we review the start-of-art works in security analytics in Smart Grid. Specifically, we first discuss the potential data sources for security analytics, and then analyze the corresponding feasible data analysis methods and visualization methods.
A. Data Sources for Security Analytics
As the integration of cyber infrastructure within smart grid, the security related data expands considerably and a multitude of potential data sources become available. The security analytics in smart grid collect and integrate a wide variety of new data for analysis and investigation. These new data • Enterprise Asset Management Systems (EAS) Specifically, we summarize both the traditional and new data sources in [147] , [151] and [152] [153] [154] in Table IX .
B. Data Analysis
Data analysis is the most important part of security analytics, the goal of which is to extract insights, detect and recognize patterns, derive conclusions and support decisionmaking. In smart grid, due to the great diversity of data property and objective systems, the data analysis methods for security analytics differ significantly. In [150] , according to the depth of analysis, the authors classify the general data analysis method into the following three categories:
• Descriptive analytics: extracts the what have occurred and current system status.
• Predictive analytics: predicts the future trend and forecasts the potential risks.
• Prescriptive analytics: supports decision making and problem prevention. The above classification captures the functional features of different methods.
As an alternative approach, Hu et al. [10] classify the data analysis methods from a technical perspective:
• Statistical analysis: is to model randomness and uncertainty by probability theory.
• Data mining: is the computational process of discovering patterns and relationships in data sets.
• Data visualization: is to represent data through pictorial and graphical format.
In this subsection, we adopt this technical perspective and focus on the smart grid security analysis methods using statistical analysis and data mining. Data visualization based methods are discussed in detail in next subsection.
1) Statistical Analysis Methods: Moreno-Garcia et al.
[155] present a safe and intelligent management platform for the distributed generations in smart grid. In particular, in order to detect power quality events, such as sags, swells, and transient faults, etc, the system integrates the skewness and kurtosis statistical estimators, as well as a real-time cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm. The CUSUM algorithm directly uses all the samples in sequence and plots the cumulative sums of the deviations of the sample values from a target value. Sedghi and Jonckheere [156] propose an attack detection scheme for SCADA system in smart grid, based on Markov graph of bus phase angles. Using conventional and PMU measurements, Conditional Covariance Test (CCT) is adopted to learn the structure of the power network. Ali and Al-Shaer [157] propose the configuration-based intrusion detection system for advanced metering infrastructure. The authors employ event logs collected at smart meters and model them by fourth order Markov Chain to demonstrate deterministic and predictable behavior of AMI, which can be used accurately to develop intrusion detection system (IDS). The IDS essentially leverages a device configuration based stochastic model checking technique. Another important aspect of the work is that a real-world dataset of thousands of meters collected at the AMI of a leading utility provider is used in the evaluation process, which significantly improves the soundness of the proposed method.
2) Data Mining Methods: Hurst et al. [158] achieve in-depth defense of a nuclear power plant against cyber threats by using behavior observations and data analysis. Specifically, feature extraction and data classification techniques are employed to evaluate data sets and detect changes in behavioral patterns. In the training mode, features are extracted to form feature vectors for both normal and abnormal behavior. Once all the required data processed, the feature vectors are sent to the evaluation process, where specific data classification techniques are applied, including uncorrelated normal density based classifier (UDC), quadratic discriminant classifier (QDC), linear discriminant classifier (LDC), decision tree (TREEC), and parzen classifier (PARZENC). The performances and accuracy of the above classifiers are listed and compared. Popovic et al. [154] implement a fault analysis platform for power transmission system by particularly focusing on the practical use of digital protective relays (DPR) data. An rule-based expert system is employed to conduct the data analysis for fault detection. Recently, Pan et al. [159] develop a hybrid intrusion detection system in smart grid, which learns temporal state-based specifications for power system scenarios, such as normal control operations, disturbances, and cyber attacks. The common path mining technique is employed to learn patterns for those scenarios from a fusion of PMU data, and system audit logs. In [160] , data stream mining is used to enhance the security of AMI through intrusion detection. Based on the difference in data stream properties, individual intrusion detection technique is specifically designed for each SMART GRID part of AMI, including smart meter, data concentrator and AMI headend. Moreover, to explore the performance and accuracy, seven implementations of data stream classifiers from massive online analysis (MOA) data stream mining framework, are evaluated using the realistic KDD Cup 1999 data set. Besides MOA, more data stream mining implementations can be found in [89] .
The above data analysis methods for smart grid security analytics are summarized in Table X . We explicitly list the data set used in the evaluation of each proposed method since they are critical to the validity of data analysis methods.
C. Data Visualization
Visualization is the most direct and effective approach to demonstrate and inspire ideas to human [161] . It would be greatly beneficial to leverage visualizations to address the security issues in smart grid. Data visualization is an essential part of security analytics [162] . The smart grid innovation enables the generation of more and more data from both infrastructures as well as applications, such as logs and measurements. With the ever changing threat landscape and dynamic infrastructure configurations, visualization of these data enables individuals to uncover hidden patterns, detect attacks, identify emerging risks and vulnerabilities, and respond decisively with countermeasures that are far more likely to succeed than conventional approaches, which is an essential part of future actionable security intelligence. In this section, we present the existing works about security visualizations in smart grid, and identify the research challenges for future work.
1) Existing Security Visualization Works:
As an early work, Klump et al. [151] visualize the security threats of power system by displaying data from phasor measurement units(PMUs) and SCADA data sources simultaneously. The SCADA data sources provide a comprehensive capture of system states but at a slow refresh rate. As a comparison, the PMU measurements can capture the system transient dynamics and generate data at a much higher rate. The integration of SCADA data and PMU data for visualization can help directly identify the security threats in the system. The proposed platform characterizes the properties of PMU data and addresses specifically the challenges of employing distributed data sources with different data generating rate. PowerWorld is employed to provide dynamic geographical view.
Recently, [163] presents a general visualized monitoring tool for distributed power generations in smart grid. The visualization tool uses an expert system to filter and analyze real-time measurements from the smart meters at transformer stations of the distribution grid, and generate diagnosis for failures and recommendation corresponding actions. It provides a geographic based main view for the current state of the grid, as well as the additional views to highlight details about the particular points of interests on demand. The status of communication network and weather are also integrated. Another work in [164] is promising since it presents a 3D visualization scheme for contingency and security in smart grid. In this work, the proposed approach employs Advanced Visual Systems Express 7.3 software, and is devoted to visualizing the physics of power grids. Specifically, the system real-time dynamics when a generator fails are visualized. The implementation consists of large data transfer program, numerical analysis program, visualization program, visualization matrix, data acquisition and data segmentation functions. Instead of just providing geographic layout, the work in [165] deals with the different hierarchical layers that exist at both topological and geographical levels, and it is highlighted by the seamlessly integration of the geographical and topological layers, allowing to understand a single node's contribution to the security of entire system from different perspectives. As the most recent work, [166] demonstrates in-progress applications of large scale data processing technologies for security visualization in Smart Grid. By using a distributed data processing model, both data from smart meter profiles and AMI networks are streamed and spatiotemporally visualized in realtime, in order to facilitate cyber attacks identification, alert and response.
Another line of works are focused on the visualizations of some particular security aspect in smart grid. Yan et al. [167] present an integrated visualization platform for smart grid, specifically for demonstrating the cascading failures in power transmission system caused by cyber attacks. The system employs ESRI ArcGIS software as visualization platform and implement its interface with MATLAB, where the attacks and defense algorithms are simulated. Matuszak et al. [168] describe the design of CyberSAVe, a visualization tool for cyber trust for SCADA system in Smart Grid. The authors first define the mathematical model of cyber trust, which consists of availability, detection and false alarm trust values, as well as a model of predictability. By employing an aggregation algorithm for all these models, CyberSAVe incorporates and visualizes the aggregated trust, which could be used by the system operator to detect, identify, and mitigate various attacks on Smart Grid system.
2) Remaining Challenges: The properties and comparisons between the above works are summarized in Table XI . We can see the visualization tools are mostly for the transmission systems with a geographical display. Moreover, since these works mainly leverage the existing visualization tools, the application of advanced visualization techniques, such as 3D visualization, is still rare. Through our studies, we find that even though a tremendous amount of research have examined visualizations for cyber security, the works specifically addressing the [153] , data visualization for smart grid security remains extremely elementary, dominated by pie charts, graphs, and Excel spreadsheet pivot tables. The smart grid data has its own features and dimensions, more efforts should be made to advance the security visualization in smart grid system.
Based on our studies, we identify a number of remaining challenges in visualization as the following:
• The objectives of security visualization can be expanded.
Instead of limiting to transmission system, SCADA and AMI, more efforts should be made for power distribution system, smart buildings and energy management system, etc, where lies higher security risks due to extensive user involvements.
• The security visualization tools should address the diversity of heterogeneous data sources, such as data generating rate, geographical locations, and duty cycles, etc. Customized visualization will also be desirable to highlight particular interests on demand.
• Advanced implementation techniques for visualization, such as cloud based large scale data sanitation, 3D representations and human interactions, should be integrated to facilitate the capabilities of real-time security monitoring and analysis.
• Predictive functions and models can be implemented within visualization to illustrate potential security risks.
IX. LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this section, we present our learned lessons throughout the process of conducting our survey works and identify several potential future research directions.
A. Lessons Learned
In this paper, we have adopted a data-driven approach to survey the existing related works about cyber security in Smart Grid. Even though it is really difficult to draw insights about the relations from the huge amount of research publications, we find following the trace of data (generation, acquisition, storage and processing) is a straightforward and efficient approach to systematically organize and analyze. Based on this, we believe it would be also beneficial to conduct future security research in a data-driven way, which is a Fig. 13 . Data-driven cyber security research framework.
data-driven cyber security research framework. The framework itself should strive to bring security, big data analytics and cloud computing technologies all together, and capture the entire lifecycle of data in cyber security research. As shown in Figure 13 , the research framework could consist of cyber security testbeds (data generation), cloud-based infrastructure (data storage and processing), and security analytics (data application). The security testbed incorporates software simulation, emulation and physical hardware to conduct cyber security analysis, which provides an experiment environment to validate cyber security strategies while generating data such as system traces and logs, etc. The security testbed stores generated data in the Cloud-based Infrastructure for Security Analytics, while retrieves required data from the Cloud-based Infrastructure when conducting the validation about Security Analytics. These three components work together to facilitate the future cyber security research in a data-driven way. This kind of full-stack approach would be also applicable to future security research in other general cyber-physical systems, such as smart transportation system and smart buildings.
B. Potential Future Research
Many challenges in the smart grid security still need more research attentions in the future. Below, we list some of the identified open issues:
• Security of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs): The large scale integration of PEVs is listed as the top seven key functions of Smart Grid [169] , which could significantly increase the use of renewable energy resources, provide energy storage to ameliorate peak load demands, and dramatically reduce the carbon footprint. As suggested in [170] , the potential security issues related to PEVs include privacy of movement, security payment, and integration security with critical infrastructure, etc. From our survey, most existing authentication systems merely apply security schemes directly to the smart grid, leaving gaps of the PEVs protection, except the most recent work in [171] . Also, more future work should look into the attack detection and vulnerability assessment methods [172] . The recent project about PEVs from European Network for Cyber Security [173] shows an increasing urgency about this research topic.
• Security of transactive energy: Transactive energy is a system of economic and control mechanisms that allows the dynamic balance of supply and demand across the entire electrical infrastructure using value as a key operational parameter [174] . As an integral part of the pacific northwest smart grid demonstrate project [175], transactive energy is a new concept that provides an approach to maintain the reliability and security of the power system. It increases efficiency by coordinating the behaviors of a large number of distributed energy resources, which embraces both the economics and engineering of smart grid system. The implementation of transactive energy requires massive distributed controls and interactions between independent entities, which would impose a significant of amount of security challenges. Sophisticated cyber-physical attacks against transactive energy could lead to serious unstable power operating conditions or even blackout. Future research should particularly explore the security solutions for this scenario.
• Security assessment tools: As the emerging of various design and implementation of security architectures for smart grid, it is essential to formally evaluate the strength and weakness of each security solution, when the security assessment tools would come into the picture. Even though there exists quite a few of theories about the assessment of smart grid security, which include probabilistic risk assessment, graph based assessment and security metric based assessment [6] , the implemented available tools are still rare. One of the leading inprogress efforts is from [176] , which applies formal and systematic analysis of different types of security assessment techniques to provide an integrative tool for largescale real-world smart grid systems security assessment. Future research should focus on the implementations and evaluations for security assessment tools, especially with a real-time interactive paradigm.
• Security architectures and frameworks in context of Internet-Of-Things: Security architectures and frameworks are the full-stack models from a global perspective and provides a complete security solution to smart grid system. As shown in our previous works, most of the works about cyber security in smart grid are concentrated on particular scenarios and specific contexts. As the convergence of smart grid system with Internet-OfThings, these security solutions should not be isolated and there should be a overall view to organize all the solutions. Reference [177] firstly presents a security architecture model for smart grid communication network, which incorporates subsystems including AMI, demand response (DR), electric vehicles, distributed resources and energy storage systems, and distribution grid management. Reference [178] also presents the security framework, security policies and countermeasures for IoT in smart grid, or called power Internet of things. The proposed security framework consisting of three layers: perception layer, network layer and application layer.
Reference [179] presents the security requirements and architectures for IoT and specifically analysis of security architecture in smart home applications. Future works should consider the general IoT architecture and its corresponding security challenges, then emphasize on the End-to-End security through a bottom-up approach. For example, how to implement security control at each level of IoT architecture, such as device level, network level, and system level.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the recent security advances in Smart Grid. By adopting a data driven approach, we characterize the security vulnerabilities and solutions within the entire lifecycle of Smart Grid data, including data generation, data acquisition, data storage and data processing. Moreover, security analytics for Smart Grid are described and discussed. Finally, potential research directions for Smart Grid security are identified. This data-driven security analysis brings new and promising perspectives and methodologies to future research in Smart Grid.
